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COASTAL PLANNING: THE DESIGNATION AND
MANAGEMENT OF AREAS OF CRITICAL
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNt
THOMAS J. SCHOENBA UM*
KENNETH G. SILLIMAN**
One of the most interesting and controversial methods of land use
control that has emerged in recent years is the regulation of develop-
ment in "areas of particular concern."' This concept, which is a
feature of several land use planning laws at the federal and state levels,
is predicated on two fundamental ideas. First, that there are certain
geographical areas possessing unique or significant characteristics
making special management treatment appropriate. And second, that
responsibility for these areas should be primarily vested at the state
level.
This development control technique has advantages over more tradi-
tional methods in that it compels the identification of fragile or impor-
tant areas that are of special value and focuses regulation directly on
safeguarding the natural characteristics, resources or public invest-
ments of the sites. The regulatory authority can also base development
t This Article was partially sponsored by the Office of Sea Grant, National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, United States Department of Commerce, and the State
of North Carolina, Department of Administration.
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. B.A., St. Joseph College, 1961;
J.D., University of Michigan, 1965.
** B.A., Case Western Reserve University, 1974; J.D., University of North Caroli-
na, 1977.
I. This is the synonym for areas of critical environmental concern used in the Coastal
Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA). 16 U.S.C. § 1454(b)(3) (Supp. III 1973). In this
article these terms will be used interchangeably.
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decisions on the impact of the proposed action on the dynamics of the
whole natural and human environment involved instead of on only a
few factors, such as water or air quality.
Despite these attributes, regulation of areas of particular concern
has not been widely used as a planning technique. One reason is that
the attention of planners has been diverted toward other issues, for
example, growth control. A more fundamental explanation is that the
designation and management processes involved have been retarded
by unresolved legal and technical problems. Foremost among these
are: (1) defining what characteristics are "of particular concern"; (2)
determining what information is necessary for designation of such
areas; (3) formulating criteria for development in a particular type of
area, once it has been designated; and (4) determining whether regula-
tion can be conducted without infringing established constitutional
norms.
Although development of the technique has been slowed by these
problems, it seems clear that regulation of areas of particular concern
will be of increasing importance in the years ahead. A requirement of
the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA)2 is that each state,
in order to qualify for federal grants for coastal zone management,
must include in its management program "an inventory and designa-
tion of areas of particular concern within the coastal zone." 3 This
designation is to assure that there is a measure of state control over
significant natural, historic or resource areas, natural hazard areas and
areas of unique significance to industrial or commercial development. 4
Specific attention must be given to developing policies and a decision-
making process to manage these areas, including formulation of
guidelines on priority of uses. 5
Virtually all the eligible coastal states have applied for or received
planning money under the CZMA to develop a coastal management
program. 6 By necessity, designation and management of areas of par-
ticular concern will be key elements in the elaboration of their manage-
2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (Supp. III 1973). See generally Mandelker & Sherry, The
National Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 7 URBAN L. ANN. 119 (1974).
3. 16 U.S.C. § 1454(b)(3) (Supp. III 1973); 15 C.F.R. § 923.13 (1976). See generally
Mandelker, Critical Area Controls: A New Dimension in American Land Development
Regulation, AM. INST. PLAN. J. 21 (Jan. 1971).
4. 15 C.F.R. § 923.14 (1976).
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1454(b)(5) (Supp. III 1973); 15 C.F.R. § 920.15 (1976).
6. The CZMA provides funds for management program development. 16 U.S.C. §
1454 (Supp. III 1973).
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ment programs. The purpose of such designation is not to exclude all
development in such areas,7 but only to assure that such areas are
subjected to special management so that their unique values and func-
tions are not destroyed. The underlying concept is that private owner-
ship rights in certain areas of the coastal zone are intimately bound up
with public needs (for example, waters, wetlands, wildlife) and sites of
important public investment (for example, ports, airports and park-
lands). In this instance the unregulated market, which is ordinarily
relied on to allocate scarce economic goods, does not properly reflect
the cost diminution or degradation of common property resources
since joint public and private interests in such goods renders competi-
tion and a competitive market price impossible.8 In order to protect
public resources, then, a system of administrative allocation must
supplement the market function in such areas. 9
This Article will first briefly examine legislation in several states
concerning the designation and management of areas of particular
concern. Attention will be focused on the North Carolina statute,
which lodges much of the responsibility for critical area planning and
management in a state-level administrative body. Secondly, two broad
areas of legal problems-the limitations of administrative law and the
constitutional restrictions of due process and equal protection as they
apply to these administrative processes-will be discussed in light of
the North Carolina planning scheme. A third section will discuss the
troublesome taking problem and how agencies can minimize the risk
that their actions will be found to be unconstitutional takings for public
purposes without just compensation.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF AREAS OF CRITICAL
CONCERN LEGISLATION
The inclusion of areas of particular concern in the CZMA reflects
7. In fact, some areas of particular concern will be shorelands where port complexes,
oil refineries and other heavy industry that is directly or indirectly dependent on access
to coastal waters will be accomodated. 15 C.F.R. § 923.13(a)(4) (1976).
8. J. HITE & E. LAURENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS,
APPLICATIONS FOR THE COASTAL ZONE 18-19 (1972). This does not exclude the possibility
of conflicts over the use of such goods; it is merely a reflection of the fact that the right
to use certain resources exists in common and is not, at least in theory, affected by
another's use.
9. Some economists argue that administrative allocation should not be allowed to
replace the market because decisions will be in the hands of a planning elite. Johnson,
Some Observations on the Economics of the Coastal Plan, 49 S. CALIF. L. REV. 749,756
(1976). This overlooks the fact that individuals still have the power to initiate develop-
ment and that mechanisms for public participation can be built into any administrative
allocation system.
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the influence of the Model Land Development Code of the American
Law Institute, a suggested uniform law for state land use legislation
that includes provision for direct state-level intervention in the desig-
nation and management of "areas of critical state concern."'" Such
treatment is reserved for areas of major public investment of more
than local significance-important historical, natural or environmental
resource lands, proposed new community sites and lands within the
jurisdiction of local governments that have not adopted development
ordinances." After the designation of these areas, local governments
are required to control development in compliance with standards
established by the state. Local development decisions may be appealed
to a state-level adjudicatory board.' 2
Despite the widely acclaimed "quiet revolution"' 13 in state land use
planning legislation, very few states have adopted this approach. Com-
prehensive "critical areas" laws have been defeated in several juris-
dictions. 14 Many states, however, have adopted embryonic critical
areas controls in the form of subjecting particular regions or resource
areas to state or regional development controls. For example, most
coastal states have adopted regulations for wetlands, which are usually
defined in terms of tidal data or plant species. 15 An increasing number
of states have set criteria for the designation of flood plains and require
local governmental regulation of development within them. 16 State
coastal zone management laws have afforded protection to shore-
lands, 17 shorelines of statewide significance 18 and arbitrary geographi-
cal areas in close proximity to the land-water margin.19 Moreover, large
geographical areas in New York,20 New Jersey2l and California22 have
10. MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE §§ 7-201 to -208 (1975).
11. Id. § 7-201(3).
12. Id. §§ 7-502 to -503.
13. F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL
(1971).
14. R. LINOWES & D. ALLENSWORTH, THE STATES AND LAND USE CONTROL 108, 122
(1975).
15. For a review of these laws, see Ausness, Land Use Controls in Coastal Areas, 9
CALIF. WESTERN L. REV. 391, 408-10 (1973).
16. For a summary of this legislation, see R. LINOWES & D. ALLENSWORTH, supra
note 14, at 103-04.
17. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 59.971 (Supp. 1975).
18. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(e) (Supp. 1974).
19. California, for example, has established a permit area one thousand yards inward
from the mean high tide line. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 27104 (West Supp. 1975).
20. New York has subjected Adirondack Park to special regulation by a regional
agency. N.Y. EXEc. LAw §§ 800-819 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
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been singled out for special management. A few states have attempted
state-wide zoning.23
Critical areas designation and management authority of the type
envisioned by the ALI Model Land Development Code has been
enacted in only a handful of states, however, and in none is it fully
operational. Six states, four of which are "coastal states"2 4 eligible to
participate in coastal management under the CZMA, have taken the
lead in the use of this planning tool. They are Florida, Oregon, Min-
nesota, North Carolina, Nevada and Colorado.
The Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act of
197225 is one of the earliest critical areas laws. The Governor and his
Cabinet are empowered to declare a geographical unit to be an area of
critical state concern if it: (1) contains environmental, historical, natur-
al or archeological resources of regional or statewide significance, (2)
is significantly affected by a proposed major public investment, or (3)
has major development potential. 26 An area must be recommended
first by the state land planning agency. The agency must specify the
area's boundaries, the basis and reasons for its inclusion and principles
for guiding its development. 27 Local governments and regional plan-
ning agencies affected by the proposal must be given notice of any
proposed recommendation and, in the event of designation, must adopt
and enforce land development regulations that have been approved by
the state land planning agency. 28 If enforcement at the local level is
inadequate, the state land planning agency can institute suit to compel
enforcement. 29
Critical area designation in Florida has proceeded very slowly. This
21. New Jersey has singled out the Hackensack Meadowlands for special regulation.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:17-1 to -86 (Supp. 1975).
22. The San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission regulates
wetlands arouqd San Francisco Bay. CAL. Govr CODE § 66632(a) (Supp. 1975). In August
1976, the California Legislature adopted a coastal plan placing development controls on
the state's 1,072-mile coastline. The plan will be administered by the Coastal Zone
Conservation Commission. 7 ENVT'L REP. (BNA) 660 (Aug. 27, 1976).
23. Hawaii, for example, has enacted a statewide land use management law establish-
ing a state land use commission. All the lands of the state are classified according to four
categories: urban, rural, agricultural and conservation. HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 205-1 to -2
(Supp. 1975).
24. 16 U.S.C. § 1453(c) (Supp. HI 1973).
25. FLA. STAT. ANNl,. §§ 380.012-.10 (1974).
26. Id. § 380.05(l)(b), (2).
27. Id. § 380.05(l)(a).
28. Id. § 380.05(4)-(6).
29. Id. § 380.05(9).
1977]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
is due largely to political pressures against state-level control and the
difficulty of compiling an administrative basis for the designation
sufficient to show that the area is in fact of state or regional signifi-
cance. Three areas-the Big Cypress Swamp, the Green Swamp and
the Florida Keys-have been designated, 30 and more than sixty addi-
tional areas are under study. 31 The experience so far shows that
Florida's program has not yet been able to overcome the legal and
technical obstacles to designating a multiplicity of smaller areas as
critical. Only large areas whose statewide importance is easy to defend
have been included.
Oregon has also devoted considerable effort to critical area designa-
tion. Under the Oregon Land Use Law of 1973,32 a Land Conservation
and Development Commission was established with the authority to
review and recommend to the legislature the designation of areas of
critical concern. 33 Priority may be given to the planning for and loca-
tion of three types of public activity-transportation facilities, public
schools and utilities, such as sewage and water supply systems-as
well as ten categories of geographical areas. The latter are: (1) lands
adjacent to freeway interchanges, (2) estuarine areas, (3) tide, marsh
and wetland areas, (4) lakes and lakeshore areas, (5) wilderness, recre-
ational and outstanding scenic areas, (6) beaches, dunes and coastal
headlands, (7) wild and scenic rivers, (8) flood plains and hazard areas,
(9) unique wildlife habitats, and (10) agricultural land. 34 The designa-
tion of particular areas is a cumbersome administrative and legislative
process that is carried out on a case-by-case basis. For each area of
critical concern recommended, the Land Commission must specify the
criteria developed and the reasons for the proposed designation, the
damages that would result from uncontrolled development and
suggested state regulations that would apply within the proposed
area.35 Not surprisingly, the implementation of this program in Oregon
has been slow; 36 to date only one area, the Willamette River Greenway,
has been designated.
30. The Big Cypress Swamp has been designated by statute. Id. § 380.055. The other
two areas have been administratively designated. See R. HEALY, LAND USE AND THE
STATES 113-17 (1976).
31. R. HEALY, supra note 30, at 113.
32. ORE. REv. STAT. § 197.
33. Id. § 197.040(i).
34. Id. § 197.230(2).
35. Id. § 197.405.
36. Akins, Designation of Areas of CriticalState Concern in Oregon, in UNIVERSrrY
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In Minnesota the critical areas designation process begins with the
Environmental Quality Council which is authorized to prepae criteria
for the selection of two types of critical areas-sites surrounding
major governmental development facilities and historical, natural, sci-
entific or cultural resources of regional or statewide importance. 37
Specific critical areas can only be designated by the Governor upon the
recommendation of the Environmental Quality Council, which must
specify the area's boundaries, the basis for the designation and princi-
ples for guiding development in the area.38 The Governor's designation
is effective for no longer than three years, and permanent approval
must be obtained by the legislature or the appropriate regional develop-
ment commission.39 The lower St. Croix River is the only area which
has been designated by the Governor under this process.40
North Carolina's "area of environmental concern" (AEC) program
is a critical areas process that applies only in twenty counties covered
under the Coastal Area Management Act of 1974.41 It requires local
governmental units to adopt land use plans pursuant to state-level
guidelines and subject to the approval of a state agency, the Coastal
Resources Commission. 42 The AEC program is intended to supplement
the local planning process by creating a separate state-local system of
direct control of development in the designated areas. The AEC desig-
nation and implementation are thus independent of the planning and
plan implementation processes, 43 but the latter must be carried out in a
manner consistent with the AEC program.4
Unlike Florida, Oregon and Minnesota, in North Carolina a state
agency, the Coastal Resources Commission (CRC), has the authority
OF NORTH CAROLINA SEA GRANT PROGRAM, COASTAL DEVELOPMENT AND AREAS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN, PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM 10 (1975).
37. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116G.05 (Supp. 1976).
38. Id. § 116G.06.
39. Id. § 116G.06 subd. 2(c).
40. Telephone interview with Ms. Yo Jouseau, staff member, Minnesota Environ-
mental Quality Council, July 24, 1976.
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-100 to -128 (1975). Under the North Carolina Land
Policy Act of 1974, the Land Policy Council is authorized to identify policies for the
determination of areas of environmental concern on a statewide basis, but this law is not
self-executing. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-155 (1975).
42. Id. § 113A-110.
43. For a description of the plan implementation process, see Schoenbaum & Rosen-
bert, The Legal Implementation of Coastal Zone Management: The North Carolina
Model, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1 (1976).
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-111 (1975).
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to designate areas of environmental concern.4 5 Categories of areas that
may be the subject of designation include: (1) coastal wetlands; (2)
estuarine waters; (3) renewable resource areas (watersheds, acquifers
and prime forestry land); (4) natural or historic areas (national or state
parks, natural and scenic rivers, wildlife refuges, complex natural
areas, remnant species areas, unique geological formations and his-
toric sites); (5) public trust areas; (6) natural-hazard areas (sand dunes,
beaches, floodways, erosion-prone areas and potential air inversion
areas); and, (7) sites around major public facilities. 46 The designation
process is a formal rulemaking procedure requiring notice, a public
hearing and a comment period.47
This process has only recently been implemented despite the fact
that the CRC has possessed this authority since 1974. The first step
was the designation of interim areas of environmental concern,48 which
became effective August 1, 1976. These include: (1) coastal wetlands
characterized by the presence of some of ten specified species of
marsh plants; (2) estuarine waters including the coastal bays, sounds
and the Atlantic Ocean to the limit of the state's jurisdiction; (3)
several public water supply areas; (4) national and state parks; (5) ten
properties owned by the State which have been designated as National
Historic Landmarks; (6) public trust submerged lands to the mean high
water mark; (7) frontal dunes along the Outer Banks; (8) ocean and
estuarine erodible areas; and (9) complex natural areas that were
nominated by members of the public. 49 The CRC has been inhibited by
political and legal uncertainties from more extensive use of its authori-
ty to designate AEC's.
Two non-coastal states, Colorado and Nevada, have also established
critical areas programs on the ALI model. In Nevada the Division of
State Lands of the Department of Conservation and Natural Resources
is authorized to carry on a statewide land use planning process that
includes the identification of "areas of critical environmental con-
cern." 50 This term is defined very generally, however, to include any
45. Id. § 113A-113. Local governments participate in the designation process through
nominating particular areas within their jurisdiction.
46. Id.
47. Id. § 113A-115.
48. The authority for interim designation is id. § 113A-114. Development within an
interim AEC does not require a permit, but notice must be given to the CRC. Id. §
113A-114(e).
49. Coastal Resources Commission Rules, subch. 7F §§ .01000 - .1401 (1976).
50. NEV. REv. STAT. § 321.720 (1975).
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area where "uncontrolled development could result in irreversible
degradation of more than local significance," 51 and this program is not
typical because more than eighty-six percent of the lands of the state
are federally owned,52 thereby exempted from state regulation. The
Colorado "areas of state interest" program is unique in that it is
administered by local governments. They are given the authority to
designate areas of state interest and to grant or deny permits for
development within such areas.53 The state-level land use commission
reviews local government designations and can nominate specific areas
for inclusion.54
From this review of jurisdictions that have established critical areas
programs, it is evident that there is no single coherent process for the
designation and management of such areas. Political considerations
have prevented the full utilization of this management tool, and the
important administrative and constitutional questions inherent in such
a program have yet to be faced. If critical areas programs and the
mandate of the CZMA to establish coastal areas of particular concern
are to be carried out, a process must be designed that surmounts and
deals with the important legal questions involved. This, in turn, can
lead to a greater political acceptance of these programs.
II. A CASE STUDY IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW FRAMEwORK FOR DESIGNATING CRITICAL AREAS:
THE NORTH CAROLINA COASTAL AREA
MANAGEMENT ACT
The North Carolina model for designating areas of environmental
concern under the Coastal Area Management Act is a useful prototype
for the analysis of the appropriate administrative framework for criti-
cal areas designation, particularly in the coastal zone. It is unique in
setting out relatively detailed statutory categories of coastal AEC's, in
delegating the power to designate critical areas to a state agency with
heavy local representation 55 and in employing a relatively simple desig-
nation process.
The North Carolina designation process involves four major
categories of administrative action. First, policies, standards and
51. Id. § 321.660.
52. Id. § 321.640(5).
53. CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 24-65.1, -401, -501 (Supp. 1975).
54. Id. § 24-65.1-407 (Supp. 1975).
55. The majority of the members of the CRC are nominated by local governments.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-105 (1975).
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criteria must be developed by the CRC for the various types of AEC's.
These must, of course, be consistent with the statutory categories, 56
but the CRC is specifically authorized 57 to adopt more detailed policies
and standards. These include not only precise scientific criteria that
will serve to define AEC's but also guidelines for the priority of uses
within each category. 8 The CRC's policies should also include a state-
ment of the basis for the inclusion of each category of AEC. This is
necessary to provide an adequate basis for the administrative action.
The second step of the process is the application of the standards and
criteria to particular coastal resources. It is essential to carry out an
inventory of resources and, with respect to each area proposed as an
AEC, to establish by means of scientific data that the particular
characteristics of the area fit the general criteria for the AEC category
in which it is to be included. At that point a proposed designation may
be adequately defined either in terms of specific geographical boun-
daries or a precise written definition. The third step requied by stat-
ute59 is public notice of proposed rulemaking to designate a particular
AEC and a public hearing on the merits. The final step is the considera-
tion of the submitted comments and the final designation of the AEC. 60
The analysis that follows will consider the legal problems and chal-
lenges that may arise with respect to this four-part designation process
and what must be done by an administrative body in order to minimize
the possibility of a successful legal attack on the process. Because the
North Carolina pattern closely follows that required for area of par-
ticular concern designation under the CZMA, 61 this inquiry should be
relevant for other coastal states as well.
A. Administrative Law and the Designation Process
An agency attempting to implement critical areas legislation must
not exceed its statutory authority or operate in violation of statutory
requirements.62 Substantively, this means that the CRC's general
criteria and standards formulated in the course of step one63 of the
administrative process must be consistent with the statutory language
56. See text at note 46 supra.
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-107 (1975).
58. Id. This step is also required by the CZMA regulations. 15 C.F.R. § 923.13 (1976).
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § I13A-115 (1975).
60. Id.
61. 15 C.F.R. § 920.13 (1976).
62. See generally 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 677-89 (1965).
63. See text at notes 56-58 supra.
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and objectives of the Coastal Area Management Act (CAMA) and that
the designation of particular geographical areas must be defensible in
terms of both the statutory language and the general criteria relied
upon by the agency.
Where an agency rule or designation violates the plain meaning of
the statutory language, it will be invalidated. In Sibson v. State, 6 the
New Hampshire Port Authority attempted to apply the requirements of
a state law which covered "any bank, flat, marsh, or swamp in and
adjacent to tidal waters" to a four-acre parcel of land on the landward
side of a salt meadow. The court, holding that the Port Authority
lacked jurisdiction, interpreted the words "adjacent to" as applying
only to land contiguous with tidal waters.6
On the other hand, an agency such as the CRC can adopt criteria to
define ambiguous statutory language or categories of critical areas,6
and in such a case, its application of the criteria to designate particular
sites will be upheld if consistent with general statutory objectives. The
courts will usually defer to an agency's interpretation, but the agency
will be called upon to produce testimony as to the scientific basis of its
action and the relationship to legislative purposes. In Juanita Bay
Valley Community Association v. City of Kirkland,67 a property own-
ers' association in Washington challenged the designation by the State
Department of Ecology of "associated wetlands" as applied to the
Lake Washington area. The relevant statute, the Washington Shoreline
Management Act, contained no specific statutory definition of this
term, but the agency drew a series of maps designating "associated
wetlands" throughout the entire state. A witness from the Department
testified that the criterion used in designating the wetland was whether
a marshy area was essentially at the same level and connected to the
major body of water. The court, in upholding the designation as con-
sistent with the statutory purposes, stated that where reasonable men
could differ on the interpretation of the statute, the agency's view will
be upheld. 61 Similarly, in Gulf Holding Corporation v. Brazoria Coun-
ty, 69 the determination by a Texas agency that a beach along San Luis
64. 110 N.H. 8, 259 A.2d 397 (1969).
65. Id. at 11, 259 A.2d at 400.
66. Under the North Carolina CAMA, several critical area categories are precisely
defined by reference to objective criteria. Others, however, are defined only in general
terms in the Act. See text at notes 96-97 infra.
67. 9 Wash. App. 59, 510 P.2d 1140 (1973).
68. Id. at 79-81, 510 P.2d at 1153.
69. 497 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. App. 1973).
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Pass was covered by the Texas Open Beach Act, which protects public
access to beaches on the Gulf of Mexico, was upheld on the basis of
evidence in the form of aerial photos and testimony of a biologist that
San Luis Beach had the characteristics of a Gulf of Mexico beach as
opposed to a bay beach. 70
Procedurally, the critical areas designation process must be carried
out by the agency in strict conformity with the enabling statute. In
addition, many states have adopted general administrative procedure
acts to govern agency decisionmaking. 71 Such an act will normally
apply to the critical areas designation process except to the extent that
a particular critical areas statute may provide to the contrary. 72 Thus,
to the maximum extent possible, the procedural requirements of both
laws must be observed. The North Carolina CAMA specifies its own
rulemaking procedure for the designation of AEC's 73 as well as provi-
sion for judicial review from permit denial. 74 But the publication of
rules of the CRC is governed by the North Carolina Administrative
Procedure Act.75
An important procedural issue is whether the critical areas designa-
tion process is rulemaking or adjudicatory. Two important conse-
quences flow from this determination. If the agency's action is ad-
judicatory, a hearing must be provided with the right to introduce
evidence and the right to cross-examine witnesses, and there is normal-
ly a right to judicial review.76 If the statute is not clear as to which is
intended, the determination will fall to the courts.
70. Id. at 618.
71. Administrative Procedure Acts have been enacted in at least the following states:
Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming and Virginia. For a
partial listing of the statutes, see W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1160-64 (1974).
72. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-1 (Supp. 1975); HAw. REV. STAT. § 91-14 (Supp.
1975).
73. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-114 to -115 (1975).
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-123 (1975).
75. It is questionable at this point whether the statutory rulemaking procedure pro-
vided in CAMA will be affected by the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act.
See text at note 72 supra.
76. The rationale for this difference in treatment is the distinction between adjudica-
tive and legislative facts, which was first advanced by Professor K.C. Davis in 1942.
Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARv. L.
REV. 364, 402-16 (1942). When adjudicative facts are in dispute, the party affected is
entitled to support his allegations by argument and proof. Londoner v. City and County
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A classic example of this problem is the Hawaii case, Town v. Land
Use Commission.7 Acting under that state's land use act, the Land
Use Commission had approved a petition to amend the district designa-
tion of certain property to rural from agricultural. The landowners
adjoining this property then brought an action challenging this deci-
sion. Plaintiffs alleged that the procedure of approval had violated the
Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act in that the Commission had
taken testimony from the applicant for the district change and had
"viewed" the actual site without giving prior notice to adjoining land-
owners. Whether plaintiffs were entitled to prior notice and the right to
rebut the applicant's testimony hinged on the determination of whether
the action of the Commission constituted rulemaking or action on a
contested case. The Hawaii Supreme Court found the action to be a
contested case and, accordingly, the denial of the notice and cross
examination rights was held to be reversible error.78
The North Carolina CAMA specifically allays this difficulty by
providing that the AEC designation process is through a rulemaking
procedure involving public notice and a hearing. 9 There appears to be
no specific right of judicial review of an AEC designation,8° although
of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). In addition, the rights of confrontation and cross
examination are constitutionally required in adjudicatory proceedings. Greene v. McEl-
roy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959). On the other hand, "parties ordinarily have no constitutional
right to present oral argument on issues of law, policy, and discretion." K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 6.01 (3d ed. 1972), citing FCC v. WJR, 337 U.S. 265 (1949).
As for statutory rights, it is rare for a state administrative procedure act to provide full
trial-type procedures for rulemaking. Hawaii's Act does provide for 20 days notice and
allows "all interested persons opportunity to submit data, views, or arguments, orally or
in writing." HAW. REV. STAT. § 91-3 (1968). However, cross examination is not provided.
Accordingly, it may be concluded that in most cases an affected person will have no
cross examination rights when an agency is engaging in rulemaking unless that agency's
organic legislation specifically provides for such a right. With respect to judicial review
of an agency determination, it should be noted that many states provide only for review
of "an order in a contested case." 1 F. COOPER, supra note 62, at 537 (emphasis added).
North Carolina has defined contested case as "any agency proceeding, by whatever
name called, wherein the legal rights, duties or privileges of specific parties are to be
determined. Contested cases include, but are not limited to proceedings involving rate
making, price fixing and licensing. Contested cases shall not be deemed to include
rulemaking and declaratory rulings." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-2(2) (Supp. 1975).
77. 55 Haw. 538, 524 P.2d 84 (1974).
78. Id. at 549-50, 524 P.2d at 91-92.
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-115 (1975).
80. Although the North Carolina CAMA does allow any person having an interest in
land within an area of environmental concern to obtain judicial review to determine
whether a final CRC decision affecting such land constitutes a taking, its provisions are
limited to decisions or orders of the CRC under Part Four of the CAMA. Id. § 113A-
123(a)-(b). Since Part Four deals only with permit applications and appeals, the section
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under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 81 a person directly affected could
obtain an adjudication of the general legal and constitutional validity of
the rule on its face. 82
B. Adequate Standards for Critical Area Designation:
The Non-Delegation Doctrine
The maxim that legislative and judicial powers may not be delegated
to state agencies has its roots in the separation of powers required by
many state constitutions .83 Although the non-delegation doctrine was
strictly applied in early state court cases, the factors that dictated the
creation of state administrative agencies have transformed this rule
into a requirement that legislative and adjudicative power not be dele-
gated without adequate "guiding standards." 4 This test has been
criticized as inadequate, however, in that it fails to furnish criteria that
can be consistently and equitably applied. 85 Thus, it has been suggested
that the significant factor in the application of the non-delegation
doctrine is not the presence of standards but rather the degree of
protection against arbitrariness.86 Consequently, a number of courts
have begun to emphasize procedural safeguards as well as standards. 87
cannot be interpreted as granting judicial review of AEC designations. Schoenbaum,
The Management of Land and Water Use in the Coastal Zone: A New Law is Enacted in
North Carolina, 53 N.C.L. REV. 275, 297 (1974). In addition, it is unlikely that AEC
designations would be reviewable under the North Carolina Administrative Procedure
Act. See note 76 supra.
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-253 to -267 (1975), as amended, (Supp. 1975).
82. E.g., CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 43 Cal. App. 3d
306, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1974); Potomac Sand and Gravel Co. v. Governor of Md., 266
Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241, cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1040 (1972); Bland v. City of Wilmington,
278 N.C. 657, 180 S.E.2d 813 (1971); J.M. Mills, Inc. v. Murphy, -R.I.-, 352 A.2d 661
(1976); Kmiec v. Town of Spider Lake, 60 Wis. 2d 640, 211 N.W.2d 471 (1973).
83. 1 F. COOPER, supra note 62, at 45. It should be noted that if the constitution of a
particular state has no separation of powers requirement, the non-delegation doctrine
does not apply. See cases cited 1 F. COOPER, supra note 62, at 45 n. 17.
84. K. DAVIS, supra note 76, at § 2.06 (3d ed. 1972).
85. Id. For a general discussion of the flaws of the "adequate standards" test see, I
F. COOPER, supra note 62, at 61-70.
86. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.15 (1958).
87. Professor Davis contends this approach has been adopted in at least California,
Iowa, Kentucky, New Jersey and Wisconsin. K. DAVIS, supra note 76, at § 2.06 n.16.
The new test is well articulated in Toms River Affiliates v. Department of Envir.
Protection, 140 N.J. Super. 135, 145, 355 A.2d 679, 685 (App. Div. 1976). In addition, the
North Carolina Supreme Court seems to have adopted this position in Humble Oil &
Refining Co. v. Board of Aldermen, 284 N.C. 458, 202 S.E.2d 129 (1974). In response to
Humble's contention that a zoning ordinance was void for lack of adequate standards the
court stated:
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Recent decisions in several state courts indicate that critical areas
legislation will not be vulnerable to attack based on the non-delegation
doctrine. In CEEED v. California Zone Conservation Commission,88
the California Court of Appeals held that the Coastal Conservation Act
of 1972 contained adequate standards to guide the agency in issuing
permits for development in the coastal zone. Found sufficient were the
general legislative policies that "the development will not have any
substantial adverse environmental or ecological effect" and that the
development will be consistent with the objectives of the act, which
were found to be preservation, restoration and enhancement of the
coastal area and balanced use of coastal resources. The court stated
that it was permissible for the agency to be empowered to use discre-
tion and judgment of a high order in weighing complex factors in the
decisionmaking.8 9 Toms River Affiliates v. Department of Environmen-
tal Protection, 9 a New Jersey case upholding the constitutionality of
the Coastal Facility Act, sustained the validity of general standards in
regulatory legislation, especially when adequate procedural safeguards
protected against unreasonable administrative action. 9' In Mills, Inc. v.
Murphy,92 the Supreme Court of Rhode Island upheld the Fresh Water
Wetlands Act although the agency was given discretion to decide on
wetland alterations governed only by the standard of "best public
interest" and the general legislative purposes of the act.93
Under the North Carolina CAMA, the CRC is delegated the tasks of
designating AEC's 94 and of adopting guidelines for the use of all
coastal lands and waters, but with particular attention to AEC's.95 The
different categories of AEC's are defined in the statute with varying
In our view the ordinance achieves reasonable specificity. Safeguards against
arbitrary action by zoning boards in granting or denying special use permits are not
only to be found in specific guidelines for their action. Equally important is the
requirement that in each instance the board (1) follow the procedures specified in
the ordinance; (2) conduct its hearings in accordance with fair trial standards; (3)base its findings of fact only upon competent, material and substantial evidence;
and (4) in allowing or denying the application, it state [sic] the basic facts on which
it relied with sufficient specificity to inform the parties, as well as the court, what
induced its decision.
Id. at 471, 202 S.E.2d at 138.
88. 43 Cal. App. 3d 306, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315 (Ct. App. 1974).
89. Id. at 327, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 330 (1974).
90. 140 N.J. Super. 135, 355 A.2d 679 (App. Div. 1976).
91. Id. at 145, 355 A.2d at 684-85.
92. -R.I.-, 352 A.2d 661 (1976).
93. Id. at -, 352 A.2d at 665-68.
94. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-113 (1975).
95. Id. § 113A-107.
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degrees of specificity. On one hand, there are several categories that
are very precisely defined. They include: coastal wetlands, estuarine
waters, water supply sources, capacity water use areas, prime forestry
land, natural and scenic rivers, scientific or research stream segments,
wildlife refuges and historic places. 96 As to these types of AEC's, the
CRC needs little if any discretionary power and there is no delegation
problem.
On the other hand, many categories of AEC's are defined only in
general terms. These are: complex natural areas, remnant species
areas, unique geological formations, public trust areas, sand dunes
along the outer banks, ocean and estuarine beaches and shorelines,
floodways and floodplains, areas of excessive erosion or seismic activ-
ity, air inversion areas and key facility areas. 97 In order to designate
these types, the CRC must necessarily exercise discretion in adopting
more detailed criteria and in designating particular geographical areas.
This may be difficult because of a lack of scientific data, differing
views among scientists on the validity of various criteria and legal
uncertainties when, as in the definition of public trust areas, 98 legal
judgment is necessary. The CRC, however, will apparently be able to
choose between competing alternatives as long as its designations are:
(1) supported by reasonable scientific evidence, (2) within the general
goals of the act, and (3) adopted in compliance with procedural for-
malities. The North Carolina courts are expected to follow the
CEEED, Mills and Toms River decisions in upholding the exercise of
such a delegation of authority since in other contexts it has been held
that a delegation is constitutionally permissible when accompanied by
a general policy standard and procedural safeguards. 99
96. See id. § 113A-113.
97. Id.
98. For a discussion of the public trust doctrine as applied in North Carolina, see
Schoenbaum, Public Rights and Coastal Zone Management, 51 N.C.L. REV. 1, 16-18
(1972).
99. Although the North Carolina courts continue to refer to the adequate standards
test in their opinions, there are indications that other factors are involved. At least two
North Carolina cases cannot be explained in terms of standards alone. Glenn, The
Coastal Area Management Act in the Courts: A Preliminary Analysis, 53 N.C.L. REV.
303, 327 (1974), citing North Carolina Turnpike Auth. v. Pine Island, Inc., 265 N.C. 109,
143 S.E.2d 319 (1965) and Martin v. North Carolina Housing Corp., 277 N.C. 29, 175
S.E.2d 665 (1970). The North Carolina Supreme Court may allow an administrative
agency to function on somewhat vague statutory guidelines if the agency can show that
review of its decisions will be accomplished in a format that meets specifically enumer-
ated administrative procedures. Public hearings are required by the N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
113A-1 14, to -115 (1975). See Glenn, supra, at 322-23. In addition, the recent enactment
of the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 150A (1975),
may add another layer of procedural protections.
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C. Substantive Due Process and the Scope of the Police Power
The objectives of state critical areas laws go beyond the traditional
land use measures such as zoning and subdivision controls. Lands and
waters are treated as resources and as units of the natural world. The
goal is not merely to provide for the orderly development of the
community, to protect against nuisances and to prevent the danger of
fire and collapse of buildings. 1'0 Rather, the legislation is designed to
safeguard the environment, natural resources and natural ecosystems.
Thus, it is necessary to inquire whether these are valid substantive
legislative goals and permissible state objectives under the police
power.
Since Nebbia v. New York, 10 1 the permissible reach of the police
power as a matter of federal law has embraced a wide range of social
and economic legislation.10 2 Recent decisions in the area of land use
legislation clearly indicate that the police power encompasses more
than the traditional purposes of zoning and includes the more amor-
phous area of environmental quality. 03 But the scope of the police
power is still an issue under the various state constitutions.
In general, the state courts have been much more active in invalidat-
ing legislation because it exceeds the scope of the police power under
state constitutions. 104 It can therefore be expected that state courts will
closely scrutinize both the objectives of critical areas laws and the
relationship of any particular designation or development control to
those objectives.
100. These purposes were upheld in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 387-88 (1926).
101. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
102. The following quotation is illustrative:
We refuse to sit as a "superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation," and we
emphatically refuse to go back to the time when courts used the Due Process Clause
"to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, be-
cause they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school
of thought."
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1962). For a general discussion of the decline
of substantive due process in the federal courts, see Strong, The Economic Philosophy of
Lochner: Emergence, Embrasure and Emasculation, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 419 (1973).
103. In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), the Court stated: "The
police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench and unhealthy places. It is
ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet
seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people." Id. at 9.
104. See Heatherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of
Law, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 229-30 (1958). Although municipal land use controls have often
enjoyed a strong presumption of validity in state courts, some jurisdictions are now
returning to more stringent review of these regulations. N. WILLIAMS, I AMERICAN LAND
PLANNING LAW §§ 5.01 to -. 06 (1974).
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Although the law in this area is still emerging, a series of recent state
court decisions indicates that protection of natural resources and
natural systems are, at least on their face, permissible objectives under
the police power. Most of these decisions involve critical areas con-
trols over wetlands, shorelands or coastal areas. In New Jersey, wet-
lands legislation was upheld, and regulation relating to environmental
and ecological considerations and the continued existence of species of
wildlife was stated to be a valid police power objective. 0 5 A Maryland
court sustained that state's dredge and fill statute, stating that it was
"within the purview of the police power for the state to preserve its
natural resources.'" 16 In Mills, Inc. v. Murphy,10 7 the Supreme Court
of Rhode Island upheld the regulation of wetlands as buffer zones and
absorption areas for flood waters, wildlife habitat and recreation areas.
The well-known Wisconsin case of Just v. Marinette County'0 8 upheld
the protection of natural shorelands as within the police power. Other
courts have upheld protection of air, soil and water, 1°9 and marine
resources10 as permissible state objectives.
Although the North Carolina courts have traditionally taken a more
narrow approach to the valid scope of the police power than some
states,"' it can be expected that the courts will uphold as valid state
105. Sands Point Harbor, Inc. v. Sullivan, 136 N.J. Super. 436,439,346 A.2d 612,613
(App. Div. 1975).
106. Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Governor of Md., 266 Md. 358, 371, 293 A.2d
241, 248, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972).
107. -R.I.-, 352 A.2d 661 (1976).
108. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
109. In re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973).
110. The regulation of marshland with saline water on it through a permit system is a
valid exercise of the police power in New Hampshire. Sibson v. State, 111 N.H. 305, 282
A.2d 664 (1971). Similarly, the regulation of filling in a bay area by a permit procedure is
permissible in California. Candlestick Prop., Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conserv. & Dev.
Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970). The aesthetic requirement that
docks constructed on the shorelines of an Adirondack Park lake be compatible with that
lake's rustic shoreline was upheld in New York, McCormick v. Lawrence, 83 Misc. 2d
64, 372 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. 1975), and the regulation of an area subject to seasonal or
periodic flooding was validated in Massachusetts. Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of
Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972).
111. In contrast- to the broad New York view, "it is still doubtful in North Carolina
whether aesthetic considerations alone will support zoning restrictions." Brough, Flex-
ibility Without Arbitrariness in the Zoning System: Observations on North Carolina
Special Exception and Zoning Amendment Cases, 53 N.C.L. REV. 925, 941 (1975), citing
State v. Vestal, 281 N.C. 517, 189 S.E.2d 152 (1972); Little Pep Delmonico Restaurant,
Inc. v. Charlotte, 252 N.C. 324, 113 S.E.2d 422 (1960); State v. Brown, 250 N.C. 54, 108
S.E.2d 74 (1959). Of course, those AEC designations which can be supported by
economic arguments as well are likely to be on firmer ground. See Note, Aesthetic
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objectives the environmental objectives of the CAMA-the conserva-
tion of natural resources and the management of the natural ecosys-
tems of the coastal area."' In Stanley v. Department of Conservation
and Development, 113 the Supreme Court of North Carolina stated that
the abatement and control of air, water and environmental pollution
were valid functions under the police power. In addition, a 1973
amendment to the North Carolina Constitution specifies that "it shall
be a proper function of the State of North Carolina . . . to . . .
preserve park, recreational and scenic areas, to control. . . the pollu-
tion of our air and water. . . and in every other appropriate way to
preserve as a part of the heritage of this State its forests, wetlands,
estuaries, beaches, historical sites, open lands, and places of
beauty. "114
Assuming that the purposes of a critical areas statute are constitu-
tionally valid on their face, agency action to implement the legislation
must bear real and substantial relation to permissible statutory objec-
tives.115 For example, in MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Dux-
bury, 16 a landowner was denied a special permit by the town board of
appeals to excavate and fill a marsh based on a zoning ordinance which
imposed controls on marshes and wetlands. On judicial review the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts annulled the board's deci-
sion. It was found that preservation of the ocean food chain was not a
sufficient ground for denying the permit where the land in question
was above mean high tide, although the court recognized that protec-
tion of marine fisheries and coastal wetlands were proper police power
objectives. Similarly, the danger of flooding and erosion, although
valid police power objectives, was not an adequate ground for permit
Zoning: A Current Evaluation of the Law, 18 U. FLA. L. REV. 430, 437 (1965). The
regulation of coastal wetlands and estuarine waters, for example, can be supported by
reference to the relation between the viability of these areas and the sports and commer-
cial fisheries catch. Potomac Sand & Gravel Co., v. Governor of Md., 266 Md. 358, 373,
293 A.2d 241, 249, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972); Tihansky & Meade, Economic
Contribution of Commercial Fisheries in Valuing U.S. Estuaries, 2 COASTAL ZONE
MANAGEMENT J. 411 (1976).
112. In addition, regulation of the environment in the interest of public health and
safety has been validated in North Carolina. See text at note 113 infra. Natural hazard
AEC's such as frontal dunes, ocean erosion areas, and estuarine and river erosion areas
should clearly fall within this holding.
113. 284 N.C. 15, 199 S.E.2d 641 (1973).
114. N. C. CONsT. art. XIV, § 5.
115. In re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973); State v. Vestal, 281 N.C. 517,
189 S.E.2d 152 (1972).
116. -Mass.-, 340 N.E.2d 487 (1976).
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denial when this problem could have been resolved by permit condi-
tions and safeguards. 17
Under the North Carolina CAMA, the discretionary actions of the
CRC must satisfy this standard. Thus the adoption of general criteria
for the various categories of AEC's should be based upon specific
resource objectives that are clearly within the general legislative pur-
poses'1 8 and the particular statutory definitions" 9 of the Act. The
application of these criteria to particular geographical areas must be
based upon empirically derived data documenting the fact that the
designation meets the criteria of a particular category. Permit denials,
in the case of privately owned land in AEC's, must be based upon the
grounds enumerated by statute, 20 accompanied by the factual basis for
such findings. In addition, the exercise of authority under the police
power must not unreasonably restrict a private landowner's right to
use his land.12'
D. Procedural Due Process Requirements for the Definition
and Delineation of the Boundaries of Critical Area
Procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment 122 requires
that an individual be given adequate notice and an opportunity for a
hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest. 123
Whether there is a constitutional right to a hearing in the critical areas
designation process is unclear. Notice and a hearing may be required
before the promulgation of a zoning ordinance or the rezoning of
specific property. 24 But critical areas designation, unlike zoning, does
117, Id. at -, 340 N.E.2d at 491-92.
118. The goals of the coastal area management system are expressed in N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 113A-102(a)-(b) (1975).
119. Id. § 113A-113.
120. Id. § 113A-120.
121. See text at notes 156-96 infra.
122. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV.
123. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970).
124. See Hart v. Bayless Inv. & Trading Co., 86 Ariz. 379, 346 P.2d 1101 (1959);
Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 277 P. 308 (1929); Bell v. Stoddard, 220 Ga.
756, 141 S.E.2d 536 (1965). Hurst and Hart, however, were based on zoning enabling
statutes which required notice and hearing. "[D]iscussion of constitutional requirements
was pure dictum." San Diego Bldg. Constr. Assoc. v. City Council, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146,
529 P.2d 570 (1974). In the San Diego case the adoption of a city zoning ordinance
through the initiative process was upheld against plaintiffs' contention that such a
procedure violated constitutional notice and hearing requirements. More significantly,
the Supreme Court has recently held that a zoning amendment adopted by referendum
vote was not invalid for failure to provide notice and hearing. Eastlake v. Forest City
[Vol. 13:15
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol13/iss1/3
COASTAL PLANNING
not in itself prohibit or affect any specific use of property. In CEEED
v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission,125 the California
Court of Appeals held that the state need not afford affected property
owners a hearing prior to implementing an interim permit system
applying only to land within one thousand yards of the coast. This may
not apply in the case of permanent critical area designation, however,
and most states, including North Carolina under the CAMA, 126 provide
for notice and a hearing prior to administrative designation.
The most important due process problem faced by an agency in
designating critical areas, however, is how to describe or limit the
boundaries of such areas in order to give affected landowners adequate
notice of the regulation of their property. Specific boundary determi-
nation will often be impractical or expensive, yet the area regulated
must not be defined in unduly vague terms. It appears that three
different methods may be used to solve this problem.
First, some categories of critical areas may be best described
through word definitions. In United States v. St. Thomas Beach Re-
sorts, 27 the court upheld a word definition of "shoreline of the Virgin
Islands" against a vagueness attack. The definition, held to give ade-
quate notice, was: "from the seaward line of low tide, running inland a
distance of fifty (50) feet, or to the extreme seaward boundary of
natural vegetation which spreads continuously inland; or to a natural
barrier, whichever is the shortest distance."'12 Word definitions are
Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358 (1976). But cf. Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs,
264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973) in which the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that zoning
decisions focusing on specific lots or landowners would be subject to quasi-judicial
review procedures. Despite this apparent disparity, the cases may be reconciled by
reference to the distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts. See note 76
supra. Thus, in the zoning field, a decision concerning a specific piece of property is
quasi-judicial, while one applying to an "open class" is legislative. See Comment,
Zoning Amendments-The Product of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Action, 33 OHIO ST.
L.J. 130 (1972), quoted in Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 574, 581, 507
P.2d 23, 27 (1973). Although the Fasano court provided little guidance as to how this
distinction can be applied in future litigation, relevant factors may include the size of the
parcel involved, who initiates the change, the number of owners affected, the label of
local decision (e.g., variance, zone change), and the nature of the deciding body. Coon,
The Initial Characterization of Land Use Decision, 6 ENvT'L LAW 121, 126-35 (1975).
125. 43 Cal. App. 3d 306, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1974).
126. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-115 (1975).
127. 386 F. Supp. 769 (D.V.I. 1974), aff'd, 529 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1975).
128. Id. at 772-73. The court stated:
Defendant does not state whether it believes the Open Shorelines Act to be
unconstitutional for this reason, on its face, or in its application. There is nothing
before the court other than defendant's naked assertion to this affect [sic].
Nonetheless, whatever may be the unexpressed contention of the defendant in this
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also common in wetlands statutes and have been upheld against a
vagueness attack. 129
Second, where mapping is desirable, the agency may informally plot
boundary lines using aerial photos and tax maps. Massachusetts has
recently adopted this form of notification in implementing its coastal
wetlands act. 130 The Massachusetts courts have not ruled on the pro-
cedural adequacy of this form of notification, but authorities have not
encountered any problem with it.131 It appears to meet "the two major
statutory functions which may be affected by definitions. One of these
functions is to guide the adjudication of rights and duties; the other is
to guide the individual in planning his own future conduct."' 132
Third, where necessary and appropriate, boundary lines of critical
areas may be described with reference to readily identifiable land-
marks, such as highways, county lines, ownership lines or geographi-
cal features. When adequate reason exists for the designation and
when necessary for administrative purposes, courts have allowed con-
siderable discretion in the drawing of regulatory boundary lines and do
not require mathematical precision or a line in which all would agree.
There must only be a reasonable basis for the particular line
selected.133
E. Equal Protection Considerations
All persons are guaranteed equal protection of the laws by the
regard, I do not believe the act to suffer from vagueness but rather consider it to
pass constitutional muster with flying colors.
Id. at 773.
129. Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Governor of Md. 266 Md., 358, 377-78,293 A.2d
241, 252, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972). In a Utah case, a district court held that
reference to a surveyed meander line provided sufficient notice. The court said: "The
fact that in one small area on the west side of the lake the meander line has not as yet
been surveyed and established does not affect this conclusion. It is something which is
susceptible of ascertainment." Great Salt Lake Auth. v. Island Ranching Co., 18 Utah
2d 45, 48, 414 P.2d 963,965, rev'd on other grounds, 18 Utah 2d 776, 421 P.2d 304 (1966).
130. The procedure is described in detail in F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET
REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL 208-09 (1971).
131. Telephone interview with Paul W. Granges, Attorney, Massachusetts Water
Resources Commission, February 17, 1976.
132. Note, Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, 62 HARV. L. REV.
76, 77 (1948), quoted in Swed v. Inhabitants of Bar Harbour, 182 A.2d 664, 667 (Me.
1962).
133. Meadowlands Regional Dev. Agency v. State, 112 N.J. Super, 89, 102, 270 A.2d
418, 425 (Ch. Div. 1970), aff'd, 63 N.J. 35, 304 A.2d 545, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 99
(1973). See text at notes 144-45, 152 infra. Of course, it may be advisable to survey
boundary lines when feasible. For a discussion of methods of demarking shoreline
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United States Constitution,134 and this requirement is also a feature of.
most state constitutions. 35 In the context of the regulation of land use,
this right affords protection against classifications that are arbitrary or
not reasonably related to legitimate objectives. 36 A classification that
is found to be unreasonable will be struck down.
A state critical areas law and designation process creates a classifi-
cation in distinguishing between those who own land within critical
areas and those who do not. In general, the courts have evolved two
different legal tests to determine the reasonableness of a classification
depending on the subject matter and the nature of the right affected.
The more lenient rational basis test is used in examining classifications
in economic and social legislation; this holds that if there is any
reasonable basis for the difference in treatment it will be sustained,
and the attacking party must establish the invalidity beyond a reason-
able doubt. 37 The strict scrutiny test, on the other hand, is generally
reserved for examining classifications involving fundamental rights
and certain suspect classifications, such as race. 38 Land use classifica-
tions generally have been judged by the rational basis test. Thus,
courts have been reluctant to overturn legislative determinations in the
area.1 39 There is no bright line distinction between the two tests,
140
boundaries, see Maloney & Ausness, The Use and Legal Significance of the Mean High
Water Line in Coastal Boundary Mapping, 53 N.C.L. REV. 185, 249-60 (1974).
134. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
135. E.g.,N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 19 (1970).
136. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1910).
137. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); McDonald v. Board of
Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1968); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, (1957).
138. For a concise discussion of cases involving fundamental interests or suspect
classifications, see Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17-20 (1972).
139. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2453 (1976); Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1973). In Young, the Supreme Court rejected
both equal protection and first amendment challenges to a Detroit ordinance prohibiting
operation of certain "adult" establishments within certain distances of each other.
140. Professor Gunther has analyzed several cases in terms of a "sliding scale"
approach to equal protection analysis. This new test would recognize a middle ground
between a rational basis test and strict scrutiny. The elements of this "minimum scrutiny
with bite" standard are as follows:
It would have the Court assess the means in terms of legislative purposes that have
substantial basis in actuality, not merely in conjecture. Moreover, it would have
the Justices gauge the reasonableness of questionable means on the basis of mate-
rials that are offered to the Court, rather than resorting to national reactions created
by perfunctory judicial hypothesizing.
Gunther, supra note 138, at 21 (emphasis added). For cases that may support Gunther's
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however, and in designating critical areas, the agency should be pre-
pared to go beyond the minimum requirements of the rational basis
test.
In a variety of contexts, courts have recently upheld state critical
areas legislation in the face of equal protection challenges. Classifica-
tions based upon both the natural characteristics and resources of
areas and upon the size of a particular development within a resource
area have been validated. In Mills, Inc. v. Murphy,141 landowners
alleged that Rhode Island's wetlands act had denied them equal protec-
tion by treating their freshwater wetlands differently and less favor-
ably than saltwater wetlands. The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in
upholding the classification, emphasized that the difference in overall
approach whereby the state promulgated a statewide plan for coastal
wetlands but required an owner to apply for a permit to develop fresh
water wetlands was susceptible to a variety of reasonable explana-
tions. The court said:
[T]he greater development pressure on coastal wetlands suggests
the need for immediate state action while the situation regarding
fresh water wetlands might not be so pressing; the high incidence
of state-ownership in coastal wetlands might facilitate centralized
action while the almost exclusively private ownership of fresh
water wetlands would tend to hinder such an approach; the prob-
able interdependence and interactions of coastal wetlands could
necessitate unitary state action while the more random pattern of
fresh water wetlands might thwart such an attempt. 142
Potomac Sand and Gravel Co. v. Governor of Maryland 43 considered
the validity of prohibiting dredging of sand and gravel from wetlands
but not interfering with the taking of sand and gravel from inland pit
excavations. This classification was held valid since the protection of
natural resources was a valid purpose under the police power and since
the prohibition of dredging in a natural area such as a wetland was
rational in the light of the harm to those areas caused by dredging. 144 In
approach, see Weinberger v. Weisenfield, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 415
U.S. 438 (1971); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The Alaska Supreme Court has
explicitly adopted this more rigorous test. Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 363 (Alas.
1976) ("This new standard will, in short, close the wide gap between the two tiers of
equal protection by raising the level of the lower tier from virtual abdication to genuine
judicial inquiry.") For a federal land use decision which applied the sliding scale
approach, but was later reversed, see Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 815
(2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
141. -R.I.-, 352 A.2d 661 (1976).
142. Id. at -, 352 A.2d at 669.
143. 266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972).
144. Id. at 373, 293 A.2d at 249.
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re Spring Valley Development, 14 5 a 1973 decision of the Maine Supreme
Court, upheld that state's Site Location of Development Act, which
applied only to subdividers of more than twenty acres. This was held to
be reasonably related to the statutory purpose of protection of the
environment because of the likely heavy impact of large
developments. 1
Not every court will unquestioningly accept the reason for a classifi-
cation, however, especially when the classification is made by an
administrative agency. Kmiec v. Town of Spider Lake147 involved
landowners who began a development after assurances by a local
official that their development would not infringe a town zoning ordi-
nance, but whose property was subsequently placed in an agricultural
classification by a new ordinance adopted by the town, based on a
proposal of a regional development commission. The court held that
the landowners had met the burden of proving there was no rational
basis for the agricultural classification. The agency determined that the
property was agricultural based solely upon aerial photos and maps
that were several years old without inspecting the property. The court
was unwilling to hypothesize conceivable justifications for this clas-
sification and, even though control of orderly community development
was accepted as a proper public purpose, it carefully scrutinized the
testimony of the official responsible for the classification and the
expert appraiser of the property.148 Moreover, other courts in consider-
ing land use classification have applied the traditional rational basis
test, but have referred either to specific trial testimony or to legislative
findings to buttress their conclusions that the classifications involved
were reasonable. 49
In order to overcome equal protection problems in adopting general
criteria and in selecting particular critical areas, an agency should,
keep careful records of the basis of its designations and be prepared to
145. 300 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973).
146. Id. at 752.
147. 60 Wis. 2d 640, 211 N.W.2d 471 (1973).
148. Id. at 648-49, 651, 211 N.W.2d at 475-76.
149. In Sands Point Harbor, Inc. v. Sullivan, 136 N.J. Super. 436, 346 A.2d 612 (App.
Div. 1975), New Jersey's Wetlands Act was upheld against an equal protection chal-
lenge. The court drew on trial testimony relating to the differences between regulated
and non-regulated areas to support its decision. Id. at 441, 346 A.2d at 614. In Toms
River Affiliates v. Department of Envir. Protection, 140 N.J. Super. 135, 355 A.2d 679
(App. Div., 1976), the court used the legislative findings of New Jersey's Coastal Area
Facility Review Act to support its conclusion that the coastal area could constitutionally
receive special treatment. 140 N.J. Super. at 147, 355 A.2d at 686.
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document the relationship of the designation to statutory goals that are
permissible under the police power. When this is done, the courts will
accept some seemingly arbitrary legislative or administrative line-
drawing, such as mapping the geographic boundaries of particular
areas or subjecting developers of projects of a certain size tract to
special rules, 150 when done for administrative convenience. 51
Equal protection considerations also require that all persons within a
particular classification be treated alike. This would prohibit an ad hoc
or piecemeal designation of critical areas within a regulated area. As a
practical matter, however, this merely requires that the designation
process be preceded by an inventory of the resources of the area and a
good faith attempt not to discriminate between like areas. Complete
knowledge and perfect data are not required under the rational basis
test, and designations may be added, deleted or modified as new data
becomes available and as conditions change. 52
An additional problem of equal protection is presented when critical
areas legislation is limited to one particular portion of a state, as is the
North Carolina CAMA which is limited to twenty coastal counties.
This in effect establishes a class consisting of the particular section of
the state subject to regulation, as opposed to the rest of the state which
is not. This also raises the question of whether such legislation is
invalid as a local, private or special act which is prohibited under the
constitutions of many states, including North Carolina. 153
These questions have been extensively litigated in New Jersey in the
context of that state's Hackensack Meadowlands Reclamation and
Development Act and the Coastal Facility Review Act. In Meadow-
lands Regional Development Agency v. State, 15 4 the court upheld the
constitutionality of the Hackensack Meadowlands Act, which created
a special regional commission to regulate development within an
18,000-acre area in two New Jersey counties. The crucial question
150. "Major developments" under North Carolina's CAMA must obtain permits
directly from the CRC. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-1 18 (1975). Major developments include,
inter alia, those "which occup[y] a land or water area in excess of 20 acres; . . . or
which occuply] on a single parcel a structure or structures in excess of a ground area of
60,000 square feet." Id. § 113A-118(d)(1).
151. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 & n.5 (1974); In re Spring Valley
Dev., 300 A.2d 752, 752-54 (Me. 1973).
152. North Carolina's CAMA allows the CRC to periodically amend its AEC designa-
tions. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-115(c)(1975).
153. N.C. CONST. art. II, § 24(1). For discussion of the possible application of this
doctrine to the N.C. CAMA, see Glenn, supra note 99, at 306-14.
154. 112 N.J. Super. 89, 270 A.2d 418 (Ch. Div. 1970), aff'd, 63 N.J. 471, 304 A.2d
545 (1972).
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under the local legislation provision of the state constitution was
whether the classification was reasonable when viewed against the
purpose of the Act. The court applied the rational basis test, and
indicated that the identical question is presented in the context of equal
protection. It was found that the Hackensack Meadowlands consti-
tuted a "vast reservoir of vacant lands" possessing factual characteris-
tics that warranted special treatment. 155 In Toms River Affiliates v.
Department of Environmental Protection, 5 the Coastal Facility Re-
view Act withstood attack on equal protection and local legislation
grounds. The court found that the "unique and irreplaceable nature of
the coastal area . . . and its importance to the public health and
welfare amply support the reasonableness of special legislative treat-
ment and regulation.' 57
Each court gave short shrift to challenges based upon the arbitrari-
ness of geographical boundaries drawn on maps. The courts explicitly
recognized that a line on a map is a product of a series of decisions
based on planning criteria and on choices made between competing
alternatives. There is no need for such a line to be ultimately correct or
beyond argument; it need only be reasonable under the circumstances
in which it was made. 15
8
A similar view is likely in the North Carolina courts. Professor
Glenn has extensively analyzed the North Carolina CAMA on the
issues of whether its application to a twenty-county coastal zone
infringed the local legislation provision of the North Carolina Constitu-
tion or the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.
He concluded that this classification was reasonably related to the
purposes of the CAMA and would be upheld. 159
II. THE MANAGEMENT OF CRITICAL AREAS AND THE
TAKING PROBLEM
Once critical areas have been designated and general principles have
been formulated to guide development, a permit-letting process is the
155. Id. at 103, 270 A.2d at 425.
156. 140 N.J. Super. 135, 355 A.2d 679 (App. Div. 1976).
157. Id. at 147, 355 A.2d at 686. The court found that the legislative findings included
in the Act expressed the reasons for the legislation and its rational correlation with the
area involved. Id.
158. Meadowlands Regional Dev. Agency v. State, 112 N.J. Super.89, 103,270 A.2d
418, 425 (Ch. Div. 1970), aff'd, 63 N.J. 471, 304 A.2d 545 (1972); Toms River Affiliates v.
Department of Envir. Protection, 140 N.J. Super. 135, 147, 355 A.2d 679, 686 (App. Div.
1976). See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
159. See Glenn, supra note 99, at 306-14.
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usual mechanism for their management. The CZMA requires and the
Model Land Development Code recommends state-level control of the
management process, although the actual grant or denial of a permit
may be the responsibility of local government. 160 Experience has
shown that local participation in management is essential to the suc-
cess of a critical areas program. 161 Some states with critical areas laws,
such as Oregon and Florida, vest permit letting in local governmental
authorities under guidelines issued by the state.1 62 The North Carolina
CAMA, on the other hand, grants this authority to the state-level CRC,
although local governments are given permit-letting power over minor
developments. 163
Whichever level of government has primary authority, effective
management implies the power to attach conditions or to deny permits
for development. Denial of a permit under the North Carolina CAMA
requires an adjudicatory hearing and specific findings of certain
statutorily required grounds."6 Lurking in the background of every
proceeding, however, will be the question of whether in the particular
case regulation constitutes a taking of private property, 165 despite the
fact that the statutory grounds for permit denial may be present. The
permit-letting agency, not wanting to commit an unconstitutional act,
will search for guidance on how far it may go in attaching conditions or
in denying a permit without infringing this constitutional norm.
There is no shortage of impressive legal scholarship 16 on the taking
issue. Its jurisprudential basis has been explored' and its origin and
history have been analyzed. 167 Writers have attempted to find guiding
principles for its application, 168 and there have been calls for reforming
160. See text at notes 3-4, 10-12 supra.
161. R. LINOWES & D. ALLENSWORTH, THE STATES AND LAND USE CONTROL 232-33
(1975).
162. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.05 (1975); ORE. REV. STAT. § 197.250 (1975). In Oregon,
however, a state agency has responsibility for issuing permits for activities of statewide
significance. Id. § 197.415.
163. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-118 (1975).
164. Id. § 113A-120. These findings would be reviewable in court under the "substan-
tial evidence" standard. In re Main Clean Fuels, Inc., 310 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973); In re
Wildlife Wonderland, Inc., 133 Vt. 507, 346 A.2d 645 (1975).
165. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.
166. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of "Just Compensation Law, " 80 HiARv. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
167. See F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 51-138 (1973).
168. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Van
Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation
Criteria, 44 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1971). The authors of this article do not purport to offer
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its impact by statute or by a decision of the United States Supreme
Court. 169 Yet, there is still tremendous confusion about this doctrine
among decision-makers who are called upon to face it on a day-to-day
basis.
The only certain proposition that may be advanced regarding the
manner the taking clause is applied today by the courts is that there is
no abstract legal theory that will provide a basis for predicting the
outcome of any particular case. This is evident from the recent cases
that have applied the taking doctrine in a wetlands or coastal context.
In Just v. Marinette County, 170 the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a
shoreland zoning ordinance that placed a landowner's property in a
conservation district. The land was in close proximity to a navigable
lake, and denying the owner the right to change the natural character of
the site was found necessary to protect navigable waters for fishing,
recreation and scenic beauty under the public trust. 171 Loss of property
value was irrelevant where the depreciation was based only on what
the land would be worth in its filled condition.'"
In Turnpike Realty Company v. Town of Dedham, 173 a zoning by-law
establishing a flood plain district was found to not constitute a taking
by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court even though the land-
owner introduced testimony of an expert witness that the highest and
best use of his property was for apartment buildings and that the value
of the land was reduced by eighty-eight percent. The court found that
the purposes of the ordinance were: (1) protection of persons and
property against floods, (2) protection of other landowners against
possible damage from the removal of the natural buffer effect of the
flood plain, and (3) saving the community the cost of disaster relief and
flood-preventing public works. The purposes were held to be valid and
the record showed that the land in question was in fact subject to
flooding. Reasonable uses of the landowner's property under these
circumstances were, the court found, woodland, grassland, agricultur-
al and recreational uses that did not require filling. 174
an exhaustive analysis of the taking question. The textual discussion is directed towards
the practical concerns faced by administrators of critical areas statutes.
169. F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, supra note 167, 238-55, 266-83.
170. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
171. Id. at 18, 201 N.W.2d at 768.
172. Id. at 23, 201 N.W.2d at 771.
173. 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973).
174. Id. at 235, 284 N.E.2d at 899-900.
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Potomac Sand and Gravel Co. v. Governor of Maryland 75 is also
instructive to show the practical application of the taking doctrine. The
Maryland Court of Appeals sustained as reasonable a prohibition on
dredging or filling wetlands because the use of the lands for this
purpose would cause too great a loss to the public benefits derived
from marshes. The court specifically cited: (1) the deprivation of
spawning areas for fish, (2) the destruction of rare species of vegeta-
tion, (3) increased turbidity of coastal waters, and (4) loss of an
accessible food supply for diving ducks. Also relevant was the fact that
seventy percent of the proposed dredge sites were tidal waters and
state-owned property.1 76
On the other hand, in MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Dux-
bury, t77 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, although it did not
directly decide the taking issue, annulled a denial of a permit applica-
tion to fill coastal wetlands on the basis that the town board in question
had a general policy that no permits would be granted to fill coastal
wetlands. The court held that the town had exceeded its authority in
not making adequate findings of fact and in not considering the extent
to which the landowner was deprived of all practical value of his
property.178 The court suggested that the town should acquire the
property in some way if its purpose was the preservation of the
marshland in its natural state. 179
In State v. Johnson,t80 the Maine Supreme Court invalidated a re-
striction on the filling of a particular plot of coastal wetlands as an
175. 266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241 (1972).
176. Id. at 375, 293 A.2d at 250. In Norbeck Village Joint Venture v. Montgomery
County Council, 254 Md. 59, 254 A.2d 700 (1969), a zoning ordinance was upheld despite
a two-thirds' diminution in value of a landowner's property. In New Jersey, wetlands
legislation has been upheld. Toms River Affiliates v. Department of Envir. Protection,
140 N.J. Super. 135, 355 A.2d 679 (App. Div. 1976); Sands Point Harbor, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 136 N.J. Super. 436, 346 A.2d 612 (App. Div. 1975). In Maine, the application
of the Site Location Law was upheld in In re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d 736 (Me.
1973). See Candlestick Prop., Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm'n
I 1 Cal. App. 3d 557,89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970); Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124,336 A.2d 239
(1975).
177. 356 Mass. 635, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970).
178. Id. at 638, 641, 255 N.E.2d at 350, 352. The town board subsequently denied the
permit a second time; on judicial review of the decision the Massachusetts Supreme
Court ordered the granting of the permit. MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals, -Mass.-,
340 N.E.2d 487 (1976).
179. 356 Mass. at 641, 255 N.E.2d at 352. See Commissioner of Natural Resources v.
S. Volpe & Co., 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965).
180. 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970).
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unconstitutional taking. It was found that the natural resource benefits
of regulation-'"the conservation and development of aquatic and
marine life, game birds and waterfowl"-were public benefits whose
cost should be publicly borne. Moreover, the land, absent the addition
of fill, had no commercial value whatever.'
81
These cases offer little guidance in guarding against unconstitutional
takings. Diminution of the value of the land involved is not the key,
since courts will overlook this to the extent they are willing to uphold
the police power purpose. 182 The distinction between preventing a
public harm versus securing a public benefit183 is not a workable test,
since one court's prevention of public harm is another court's securing
of a public benefit. 18 The North Carolina CAMA adopts a statutory
test-whether the restriction deprives the owner "of the practical uses
of [his property], being not otherwise authorized by law."' 185 But this
rule, as Professor Glenn has demonstrated, 86 merely codifies the con-
fusing case law in North Carolina and presents the problems of deter-
mining a "practical use" and when a restriction is "authorized by
law." 87
As a practical matter, a permit-letting agency must learn to live with
uncertainty on how the taking clause will be applied. It should be
realized, however, that taking cases turn on their facts and that it is
within the agency's power to deal with and to minimize this problem.
181. Id. at 716. Contrast the decision of the same court in In re Spring Valley Dev.,
300 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973). The court distinguished Johnson because in Spring Valley there
was nothing in the record to indicate an unreasonable burden. Id. at 749. For earlier
cases holding that an unconstitutional taking existed, see Bartlett v. Zoning Comm'n, 161
Conn. 24, 282 A.2d 907 (1971); Dooley v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn.
304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of
Parsippany - Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
182. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles,
57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 36 (1962) (property
in question rendered worthless).
183. Under the harm-benefit test a taking occurs when the police power is used to
secure a public benefit. For criticism of this rule, see Bowden, Legal Battles on the
California Coast: A Review of the Rules, 2 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 273, 281-82
(1976).
184. This is readily apparent from a consideration of the cases cited in notes 174-81
supra.
185. N.C. GEN. STAT. § l13A-123(b) (1975).
186. Glenn, supra note 99, at 330-38 (1974). The case from which this statutory
definition was apparently taken is Helms v. City of Charlotte, 255 N.C. 647, 122 S.E.2d
817 (1961).
187. See Glenn, supra note 99, for a discussion of these problems.
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Careful agency rulemaking and factual development are the best
method of minimizing the risk of unconstitutional taking. In the con-
text of an agency managing critical areas, three particular suggestions
may be made.
First, in drafting guidelines for priority uses for different
categories, 188 the agency should list what uses of land are practical for
each type of critical area. This listing should not be a mere pro forma
exercise but should represent a good faith attempt by the agency to
nominate practical uses that would be consistent with the resource
value objective of the particular category. 8 9 It should be made clear
that no general prohibition against changing its natural character is
intended if it can be done without infringing specific resource values.
Second, the purposes of the use restrictions for each category of
critical area should be carefully and precisely expressed in the general
guidelines. Such purposes, in order to be valid, must be permissible
state objectives under the police power. The purposes to which use
restrictions are tied will range from the more traditional police power
objectives to the newer and more controversial. Traditionally, per-
missible police power objectives have included protection of property
and persons from natural hazards, safeguarding major public invest-
ments, assuring the orderly development of the community, and pro-
tecting the public from having to bear the financial burden of disaster
assistance and the construction of structures to protect persons and
property against natural hazards. There should also be little doubt that
protection of important resources, such as air, soil, water and marine
fisheries, is permissible under the police power.190 The basis for pro-
tecting these objectives should be based on existing water and air
quality standards, as well as study of the "carrying capacity" of such
resources to accommodate development.' 9'
The protection of public rights and the public trust have also been
188. This is a required step for the designation of areas of particular concern in
coastal zone management. See note 58 supra.
189. For examples of this, see Turnpike Realty v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221,
284 N.E.2d 891 (1972); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
For descriptions of planning methods, see I. McHARG. DESIGN WrrH NATURE (1969);
KAISER, PROMOTING ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY THROUGH URBAN PLANNING AND
CONTROL (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Grant No. 801376, 1974); Lyle &
Wodtke, An Information System for Environmental Planning, AMER. INST. PLAN. J. 394
(Nov. 1974).
190. See text accompanying notes 104, 105 and 108 supra.
191. See generally D. GODSCHALK, F. PARKER & T. KNOCHE, CARRYING CAPACITY: A
BASIS FOR COASTAL PLANNING? (1974).
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recognized as proper public purposes under the police power. 92 Al-
though the precise extent of the public trust doctrine is uncertain in
many states, 193 the emerging view is that it is a source of public
ownership of tidelands and lands under navigable waters.19' This would
include many coastal areas, such as beaches, estuarine lands, shore-
lands and marshlands. In some states the public trust doctrine has been
more expansively defined as including habitat for wildlife and marine
life.195 In addition, legal doctrines other than the public trust doctrine
have been recognized as the source of public rights to use the dry sand
area of beaches' % and non-navigable waters."9
The most controversial police power purpose in the land use context
will be the preservation of wildlife, natural areas and rare species of
plants and animals. These are increasingly recognized as legitimate
state objectives, however, by constitutional amendment'" or by court
decisions upholding a broadened view of the police power.' 99
Third, a management agency under a critical areas statute should
develop a factual record in each case to show the relationship of any
permit restriction or denial to a particular public purpose, as well as the
necessity of the restriction in order to achieve it. If it cannot be shown
that a restriction on development is reasonably related to even an
unquestioned public purpose, a taking problem may result.2 ° Thus,
care must be taken by the agency in making its findings of fact.
192. Potomac Sand and Gravel Co. v. Governor of Md., 266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241
(1972); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). See N.C. CONSr.
art. XIV, § 5.
193. See generally Schoenbaum, Public Rights and Coastal Zone Management, 51
N.C.L. REv. 1 (1972).
194. State v. Ashmore, 236 Ga. 401,224 S.E.2d 334 (1976); International Paper Co. v.
Mississippi State Highway Dep't, 271 So.2d 395 (Miss. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827
(1973); Borough of Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972);
Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 177 S.E.2d
513 (1970); Cape Romain Land & Improvement Co. v. Georgia-Carolina Canning Co.,
148 S.C. 428, 146 S.E. 434 (1928). See generally Comment, The Public Trust in Tidal
Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762 (1970).
195. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
1%. United States v. St. Thomas Beach Resorts, 386 F. Supp. 769 (D.V.I. 1974),
aff'd, 529 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1975); Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50,
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P.2d 671 (1969) (custom); Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. 1964)
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It must be recognized, however, that the police power alone cannot
be relied upon to achieve natural area preservation in the coastal area.
Where it is desirable to go beyond the protection of specific police
power objectives, public acquisition will be necessary. Effective land
use management to achieve the preservation of natural diversity re-
quires the creation of a separate but related program to survey poten-
tial natural areas and to secure their acquisition by means of purchase
or gift of legal title, easements or development rights.20 1
CONSLUSION
Critical areas controls have not met with great success so far be-
cause they have involved large geographical areas and only generalized
regulatory purposes. There is understandable opposition to state-
imposed land use controls using a broad-brush approach. A more
workable critical areas program is the designation of specialized geo-
graphical areas tied to particular state police power objectives. The
experience of North Carolina's "areas of environmental concern"
program tends to indicate that this approach is more politically accept-
able and easier to implement because the planning process can be left
largely in local hands.
201. For recommendations and a survey of state natural area preservation programs,
see generally THE PRESERVATION OF NATURAL DIVERSITY: A SURVEY AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS (The Nature Conservancy 1975).
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